Making sense of environmental complexity in a reform context: the case of megaproject alpha by Veenswijk, M.B.
American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 2012, 2, 109-115 
doi:10.4236/ajibm.2012.24015 Published Online October 2012 (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/ajibm) 
109
Making Sense of Environmental Complexity in a Reform 
Context: The Case of Megaproject Alpha 
Marcel Veenswijk 
 
Department of Organizational Sciences, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 
Email: m.veenswijk@vu.nl 
 
Received April 19th, 2012; revised June 4th, 2012; accepted June 19th, 2012 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, new concepts on environmental complexity and sense making are developed and explored and analysed. 
The article based on a case study regarding a public-private collaboration in a Dutch infrastructural mega project. It is 
argued that the ability to influence the direction of the change process of the mega project “Alpha” depends on the way 
actors are able to influence the so aleed “cultural interfaces” into the power arena by means of a specific group of or- 
ganizational stakeholders. After a short theoretical introduction, we describe the case in terms of two dominant cultural 
stages and their specific interface dynamics. The paper concludes with a general reflection on the central concepts. 
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1. Introduction 
Although the societal impact of large scale construction 
projects (“Mega projects”) is enormous, academic in- 
terest on this subject has been modest. The discussion 
seems to be limited to the rational organization and (po-
litical) control in terms of policy programs, contracting, 
perceived outcomes, and especially risk and economic fail- 
ures [1]. 
Mega projects are considered to be as much the object 
and outcome of social interactions as any other form of 
organizing within a multiple context of socially interde- 
pendent networks. The institutional connotation related 
to “policy formulation versus implementation”, “design 
versus construct” or even “BOOT” (Build Own-Operate- 
Transfer) are ways of bracketing normative (first order) 
reality definitions of these relationships. Mega project 
can be discerned from other enterprises in terms of con-
tent (including the physical artefacts that result from the 
projects), temporality (the assumption that the project 
reality is limited in linear timescales and spaces), con- 
textual “patching” (the idea that ambiguity is excluded 
via (politically) legitimized contractual modes, and social 
variation (amount of social interactions related to the pro- 
jects mission and goals) [2]. 
In the late 1980’s of the last century, many European 
countries worked on an European network of high speed 
railways. The ministers in the European Commission of 
Transport gave in 1990 their approval to the development 
of an European high speed railway network. The Euro- 
pean infrastructural network was intended to improve the 
economical situation in the European Community and to 
form an environmental friendly alternative for air and car 
travel in Europe. The Netherlands, as part of the Euro- 
pean Community, developed two distinct high speed rail- 
ways; one to the south and one to the east. As with other 
European countries, a part of the financial support came 
from the European Community [3]. 
The first plan for developing the high speed railway 
south and east was presented to the Dutch government 
already in 1991. Because of the social and environmental 
impact of the project on the dense populated Netherlands, 
and because of the financial consequences only the high 
speed railway to the south was approved by the govern- 
ment. A project-organization (called Alpha team), re- 
wrote the plans into a huge memorandum of more than 
23 reports. An important condition in the construction of 
the railway was the need of partly private finances. Fur- 
thermore, the infrastructure should be exploited profita- 
bly. In 1996 the Dutch parliament agrees upon the con- 
struction of project Alpha to realize a safe and comfort- 
able train passage from Amsterdam to Belgium with a 
speed of 300 kilometers a hour. 
During the last decade, infrastructure became one of 
the main issues on the Dutch political agenda, Project 
Alpha attracted a lot of (international) attention, not only 
for their societal implications, but particularly because 
they were characterized by major deviations in terms of 
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overspending, incorrect timeframes/planning and cor- 
rupttion, which resulted in intensive parlementairy in- 
quiries and a redesign of control models and steering 
design. Originally, the project was designed as (experi- 
mental) public-private constellations in which public and 
private actors participated and had a joint responsibly for 
construct and design, as well as for exploitation. Al- 
though most of the designing was actually the result of 
public-private cooperation, and the hybrid organizational 
construction was reflected in the way the project organi- 
zations were empowered (70% of the employees were 
hired on a temporal basis, 30% were public employees), 
exploitation remained a matter of the state. This also 
counts for the (public sector) hierarchical—machine like— 
formal construction which was chosen in order to build 
the projects. The top managers of the project organiza-
tion were all public employees. The CEO, (called Hoof- 
dingenieur directeur), reported (via the secretary-general 
of the ministry) to the Minister of Transport [4]. 
This paper focuses on the ways actors within the Al- 
pha project deals with environmental complexity in a 
shifting reform context. Alpha project is one of the larg- 
est infrastructural project in the history of the Nether- 
lands. Many technological complex problems had to be 
solved to dig a seven kilometre long tunnel in instable 
clay, to build bridges over wide rivers, to stabilize the 
railway in swampy grounds and to reduce environmental 
impact in dense populated areas. Furthermore, thousands 
of civilians living next to the high speed railway are in- 
volved as well as 19 local governments, three counties 
and twelve offices for water management. The complex- 
ity for realization of the mega-infrastructural project was 
increased by the many construction and engineering com- 
panies, governmental departments, the Dutch Railways 
and many other organizations. 
This project is relevant because it contains a specific 
form of complexity which cristallizes in an organiza- 
tional arrangement, based on the idea of “loose coupling” 
via multi-lateral contract-forms. The case describes the 
way the project was internally organized, the art of the 
contracting relations between the various actors and the 
surveillance structure around these contracting/control 
modes. 
After introduction of the theoretical nese, the case is 
introduced and presentated in four basic episodes. The 
analysis of the cases is concluded with some conclusive 
remarks as well as a reflection on basic theoretical con- 
cepts. 
2. Theoretical Backgrounds 
Ethnographic studies on organisational configurations 
underline the notion that (concepts of external) project 
environments are subject to processes of social construc- 
tion [5]. In order to cope with contextual complexity and 
ambiguity, project actors construct a more or less stable 
working environment for themselves. The subjective state 
of “world-openness” changes along with the dynamics of 
the project into an objectified situation of world-closed- 
ness, which strongly influences and steers actors’ behav- 
iour within that stabilised environment. 
“Organisational environment” is one of the broadest 
concepts in organisational studies, as it can be extended 
to include almost every aspect of physical and textual 
context. Organisational scientists use the term “organisa- 
tional environment” to refer to nations, politics, econom- 
ics, technology, history, physical settings, demographics, 
religions, regions, occupations, and industries. The dis- 
tinction between organisations and their environment 
makes it possible for organisational scientists to consider 
organisations as separate entities. Yet, the two are not 
easy to separate. By drawing a clear boundary between 
organisations and their environments, new questions 
about the permeability of these boundaries arise. Organ- 
isational members simultaneously perform activities in- 
side and outside of organisations. For that reason, Pfeffer 
and Salancik defined the control of organisations over 
the activities of employees as one of the central bounda- 
ries of an organisation [6]. Beyond these boundaries, the 
influence of an organisational environment on the active- 
ties of employees is more dominant than internal organ- 
isational control. Starbuck defined multiple boundaries 
by one’s distance from an organisation’s centre. The first 
boundary includes both organisational members and peo- 
ple who are conventionally regarded as members of other 
organisations but who are involved in the organisation’s 
activities. The second boundary implies that all those 
without are not involved in the organisation’s activities 
[7]. 
Organisations and environments are interrelated since 
organisations are dependent on their environment, and 
environments create uncertainties for organisations. This 
interdependence receives primary attention in the open 
systems perspective. Any boundary between an organisa- 
tion and its environment is partially arbitrary; organisa- 
tions are perceived as open systems with permeable 
boundaries. Scott sees organisations as “open systems”, 
in which an organisation can be characterized as a coali- 
tion of shifting interest groups which develop goals 
through negotiation. The structure of the coalition, its ac- 
tivities and its outcomes are strongly influenced by en- 
vironmental factors [8]. 
To solve the “problem” of permeable boundaries be- 
tween organisations and their environments, organisa- 
tional anthropologist Chanlat developed a framework to 
study organisations and their environments by focusing 
on human behaviour while at the same time exploring all 
the relationships within the environment which run 
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through organisational life at different levels. Chanlat 
used a holistic analysis of organisational environments to 
understand the behaviour of individuals in organisations. 
He distinguishes five closely linked levels of organisa- 
tional reality. The first level is the individual level, in 
which Chanlat sees human reality as a subtle interaction 
of the biological, the psychic and the social. At this level, 
individuals construct and deconstruct their own reality 
and cope with conflicts, tensions, uncertainties and am- 
biguities. At the second level, the interactional level, the 
identity of an individual is formed in interactions with 
others. These interactions, formal and informal, can take 
place between two different individuals or between two 
different groups. The third level, the organisational level, 
focuses on organisational cultures. The fourth level, the 
society level, concerns national cultures. These national 
cultures have evolved due to geography, history, political 
and economic forces, language and religion. The fifth 
level, the global level, deals with such transnational ide- 
ologies as religion, globalization and liberalization [9]. 
Each level is analytically independent and contains ele- 
ments which are linked to each other in relatively stable 
relationships. There is no hierarchical relationship be- 
tween the different levels; the levels are contingent in 
nature and the relationships can move in any direction. 
Actors more or less “externalize” the different levels, ac- 
cording to their specific perspective and project con- 
figuration. 
According to Berger & Luckman, externalization is a 
basic condition for survival in a social context. As a re- 
sult of continual externalization, some aspects of the so- 
cial world are objectified, providing them with a status 
which is unrelated to the individual who has externalised 
them. Objectification concerns the process in which pat- 
terns of behaviour of specific aspects of human activity 
become ‘facts’ external to actors [10]. 
Weick stated that cultural development in organisa- 
tional contexts can only be understood by means of 
processes which develop within organisational configu- 
rations. In his opinion, these processes can be divided 
into three sequential phases [11]. The first phase he dis- 
tinguished is enactment. Actors create a context or envi- 
ronment for themselves, from which they constantly se- 
lect and enact a number of elements which they regard to 
be relevant. According to Weick, actors continuously 
ascribe new meaning to their reality, rather, to their con- 
text during interaction. 
As project members are constantly communicating 
with each other and adjusting their behaviour so that it is 
in line with that of others, they are continually actively 
interfering with their own environment. In other words: 
in their daily interactions they create a significant part of 
what they experience as their central meaning patterns. 
Of the many contextual facts, some aspects are called 
“relevant”, while others are dismissed as “irrelevant”. 
This selective bracketing of facts results in such a reduc-
tion of complexity that it becomes acceptable to maintain 
it as a useful reality. Through this process of enactment, 
actors generate their own subjective view of reality 
throughout time. After the first phase of enactment, the 
next phase, selection, can begin. In this phase, the parts 
of ‘reality’ that can be used in a certain situation are se-
lected using a complex of criteria. After all, the project 
actors have isolated the facts that have been placed be-
tween brackets during the first phase, but they have not 
yet been interpreted and rid of any ambiguity. In the 
phase of selection, the rough data from the environment 
is interpreted using cognitive maps. These are causal 
structures that provide information over the meaning that 
facts have in regard to each other. 
In the final phase, those of retention, a further reduce- 
tion of the complexity takes place. Not only is the taking 
in of new information characteristic for this phase; in- 
formation that is already stored in one’s memory is also 
tested. Through this, a number of “gestalts” arise, with 
which new situations can be “recognised” quickly and 
can be reacted upon using the logic of the gestalts. 
Should new information no longer “fit” with the stored 
information (or with the gestalt) then, in time, a modify- 
cation in the cognitive structure will take place. For 
Weick, project development is no more than a group of 
social processes, in which individual actions of two or 
more actors are related within an environmental context. 
By that he means that the action logic of various inter- 
acting actors is related. According to Weick, that link can 
be observed when the actions of actors that are busy 
talking to each other are analysed: one person’s behave- 
iour turns out to be “correlated” to the other person’s be- 
haviour and vice versa. The main line is that the process 
of cultural development is an action circle in which the 
phases of enactment, selection and retention continually 
alternate [12]. 
The elements that are regarded as relevant are placed 
“between brackets” in order to reach an acceptable re- 
ducetion of ambiguity. Actors interpret the elements that 
have been placed between brackets using their own webs 
of significance. These webs of significance develop dur- 
ing processes of interaction between actors. After the 
elements of the context have been interpreted, they are 
stored in the actor’s memory in the retention phase and 
set up against information that has been internalised by 
the actor in an earlier phase. In this phase, actors’ active- 
ties develop into routines. Events and problems that the 
actor faces are ‘recognised’ from an existing frame of 
reference and solutions are created from the patterns de- 
veloped in previous phases. In time, the elements, ap- 
proach to problems and attributes with which one is con- 
fronted, become reifications: They reach the status of 
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“fact” or “objectivity”. It is taken for granted that these 
objectifications have no independent reason for existence 
outside of actors. However it is also assumed that these 
“facts”, which are recognised as such by certain actors, 
can be taken over by other actors in processes of interact- 
tion and as such be internalised by others. 
In traditions and rituals, certain ideas and action pat- 
terns of project actors are passed on. Changes in webs of 
significance arise when certain elements are enacted 
through processes of interaction and therefore no longer 
fall within existing cognitive maps [13]. Actors find 
themselves confronted with problems and challenges 
they did not have to deal with in the past and, through 
processes of interaction, they create a new “reality” that 
can be used to solve them [14]. For instance, the rise of 
information technology has had major cultural cones- 
quences for many project organisations. More than in the 
past, the frames of reference that have developed in light 
of the new technological developments are about techni- 
cal superiority and the belief in the fact that technically 
“loaded” projects are able to provide a “rational solution” 
for problems that seem impossible to solve. We see this 
in the case of ALPHA, which illustrates the organisa- 
tional reflection in terms of technical as well as social 
and moral constructed environmental definitions. 
3. Research Methods 
The ALPHA case reconstruction is a result of intensive 
study, which was executed by a team of a senior re- 
searcher and two research assistants. The research in the 
ALPHA case was “sliced” into a number of phases, in 
which the attention shifted from element to element of 
the culture being studied. The most important motivation 
for a phased method was that it is the only way for a 
researcher to create a well-organised and controllable re- 
search agenda with room for interim reflection and 
correction of possible “blind spots”. The research was 
split up into four main phases: 1) General orientation on 
the project environment within which the organisation 
operates; 2) Analysis of important documents from the 
organisation and the context of the unit that was to be 
studied; 3) Focussed interviews with employees, exem- 
ployees and relevant key figures from the environment; 4) 
Search for confirmation of the conceived re search data 
and interpretations. Naturally, each phase started with an 
introduction, in which agreements were reached on the 
research and a short presentation of the method was 
given. During a period of six months (semi) open indi- 
vidual interviews were held with 20 stake-holders within 
the project and 20 actors in the context of the Project 
organisation, especially clients (10), representatives of 
pressure groups (5) and general public (5). Further, key 
meetings were observed and important documents were 
analysed. 
4. Case Description 
From the start, European stakeholders described the 
ALPHA project in terms of its innovative capacity “uni- 
que” character [15]. Early policy papers report about the 
innovative cocepts and creative management philos- 
pohy. 
The project team that created the project infrastructure 
was defined as “professional entrepreneurs”: A highly 
trained group of expers with a large mandatory budget. 
The project was originally designed as an (experimental) 
public-private constellation in which public and private 
actors participated and had a joint responsibly for con- 
struct and design, as well as for exploitation. 
The organization consisted of a so called public-pri- 
vate (BOOT) arrangement (seventy percent of the em- 
ployees were hired on a temporal basis, thirty percent 
were public employees), exploitation remained a matter 
of the state. This also counts for the (public sector) hier- 
archical—machine like—formal construction, which was 
chosen in order to build the project. The top managers of 
the ALPHA organisation were all public employees. The 
CEO (the engineer who is the responsible for the techni- 
cal part of the entire project) reported via the secre- 
tary-general of the ministry to the Minister of Transport. 
The project can be described in two (more or less) suc- 
cessive episodes, with a timeframe of ten years. 
Phase 1: Controlling environmental complexity through 
separation (1996-2001) 
The reason for using a complete set of new techniques 
and readjustments had to do with the highly unstable 
physical circumstances. For example, in order to spare 
the valuable scenic landscape it was decede to make a 
large tunnel. For this, a (unique) construction with a di- 
ameter of almost 15 metres should be one of the largest 
bored tunnel in the world. Because of its technical supe- 
riority and ecologically sound design, this tunnel became 
the symbol of the ALPHA “high-tech” quality. 
The project organization deceide to divide the project 
in five project agencies, connecting the different geo- 
graphical entities. The interconnection was realized via 
various ranges of contracts, between the principal and the 
agencies on the on hand and between private architects, 
or constructors, and the agencies on the other hand. In 
total, there were more than 900 (sub) contracts in opera- 
tion. 
Monitoring of the contracts took place on a quarterly 
basis, and surveillance was arranged via a complicated 
set of ICT-systems. Athough initially, the management of 
ALPHA project centred in Capital City (Ministry of Trans- 
por) after one year the leading project team moved to a 
separate location outside Capital City As a result of large 
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scale reorganizations in the Ministry and new regulation 
acts, the project team was forced to internalize new 
“subsets of behaviour” regarding the management of the 
project. The European guidelines (e.g. Technical Speci- 
fications for Interoperability) also had to be incorporated 
therein. A concessions act was going to be passed which 
was to regulate the relationship between a Transport Op- 
erating Company (TOC) and the State. The relationship 
between the State and the Infra manager was going to be 
regulated by means of a concession [16]. 
The impact of the changes concerned more than just 
the project organization. The original idea to divide all 
the work into some forty traditional contracts (including 
the idea that the railway would be responsible for the 
“commercial customer part”) was rigorously altered. The 
outcome of the severe discussions resulted in a thirty 
year covering Design, Build, Finance and Maintain core 
contract, which included a set of five connected Design & 
Construct sub-contracts [17]. 
Since there was only limited experience of driving at 
high speed, a railway construction without (the usual) 
ballast was created; besides the planned (one of the larg- 
est) underground Tunnel (in terms of its diameter in mel- 
low soil) this was one of the major innovations in the 
project. 
As part of the management “ideology”, the credo “de- 
central unless” coverd the basic responsibilities between 
the Ministry on the one hand and the ALPHA orgnaiza- 
tion on the other hand. The contractors were held respon- 
sible for the planning and budgetary issues. Interventions 
from the ministry were only accepted in specific, crisis 
like situations. The logic behind this was that managers 
“on spot” were probably better informed than their col- 
leagues in Capital City. 
In 2002, a new conflict arose around the quarterly re- 
ports. The reports were available in a limited online en- 
vironment, but only a small group of team members had 
access to the data and were able to interpret deviations. 
While the “frontstage” reality of the project, more and 
more became dominated with technical imperatives and 
technical/rational models of report, day to day reality 
showed a different picture. Conflicts about the work were 
only partly visible in the reports and were kept ‘back- 
stage’ within the subgroups [18]. 
Conflict issues, such as lack of trust on accuracy of 
data between different parties, cultural tensions between 
the groups, inadequate communication and frequency of 
report lead to a growing tension between the principal 
actors (Ministry) and the project team. 
The conflicts resulted in a set of interventions, which 
were indicated by the Ministry. Not only was a new top 
executive appointed and made responsible for the entire 
project organization. Also the organizational vision was 
transformed into a “central unless” adagium, backed with 
series of dialogue sessions, round tables and job rotations 
in which the different contract teams were more or less 
forced to operate. In order to deal with the “information 
problems”, a specific set of new reporting procedures 
were implemented and a major reduction and clustering 
of contracts was decided upon. 
Stage 2: Institutional transplantation and consoli- 
dation (2003-2010) 
Six months after the implementation of the intervene- 
tions, a new chapter in the project started. “System-Inte- 
gration” became the new focus and basically concerned 
the connections between the basic main ports as well as 
ways to deal with risk items concerning the interconnec- 
tions. 
The team claimed that additional risk reservations and 
as a result of this: New financial claims, which—again— 
caused media commotion and a political quest to re- 
structure the organization of ALPHA. A tripartite Board 
of Directors (role model for all the CCE directorates) was 
installed in which the connection with the Infra manager 
and the responsibility for the control of the project was 
strongly emphasized. In addition, the main department of 
Transportation, Safety and System-integration was split 
up, as was the main department that managed the con- 
tract with Trail [19]. 
Besides the Ministry and claims of political represent- 
tatives, the ALPHA project team members were con- 
fronted with additional problems that were hardly pre- 
dictable. For instance, the problems that arose in 2003 
with regard to the height of platforms at the stations situ- 
ated along the ALPHA-railway. In order to standardize 
the high-speed rail system a series of European directives 
by the European Transport Committee, e.g. Directive 
2001/16 which is part of the EU Safety Rules were in- 
troduced. Alpha was forced to standardize many objects 
in their project, such as the height of platforms. Adaption 
to these new “complexities” caused new uncertainties 
and tensions in the ALPHA organisation. During the im-
plementation of the directive, most of the technical blue-
prints of the stages had already been completed and the 
team realized that redesigning the stages would be very 
expensive. Eventually, new blue prints were construct- 
ed, with a new delay of several months. 
Implementation of the Railway Act in 2006, resulted 
in a new focus shift. The project as such more and more 
became the shadow to the transportation component. And 
this resulted once again in tensions. In line with this, 
control-oriented issues about the transportation compo- 
nent came up, such as: “we wish to make agreements 
with the ALPHA”, or “the ALPHA should do X”, or 
“when will the ALPHA do Y” etcetera. Questions which 
did not square with the nature of the agreement with the 
ALPHA, a rather functional and distant (public) agree- 
ment, respectively did not square with the formal posi- 
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tion of the management of the ALPHA. Often questions 
arose around specific responsibilities of project managers 
versus responsibilities the Ministry of Transport or the 
Infra manager. These comments were not taken well, and 
also the interpretation of there role as a team—behind the 
scenes, informal, influential, helpful, statutorily pure, 
helping everyone to assume their assigned roles, and hold 
them to it—came under pressure as a result. 
Although the reflection on the mission of the project 
remained a central issue to the Alpha team until the end 
of the project, the “Integral Transport System” and “Turn- 
Key Delivery”, appeared to be the ultimate political mes- 
sages for the entire management of the ALPHA. These 
issues not only became a mantra for political representa-
tives, but at the same time created an efficient wall to 
hide behind when “difficult questions” came up, regard-
ing next steps and new projects. 
5. Analysis and Conclusions 
In the case of the Alpha project, the cost factor became 
the major struggle for management as well as for politi- 
cal representatives. As we have seen, the original decen- 
tralization oriented strategy pushed towards a large vari- 
ety of types and amounts of internal contracts. Although 
the one sided focus on contracting was seen as a crucial 
vehicle in the battle against cost overrun, this strategy 
was insufficient. The (relatively) separated contracts 
were related to specific artefacts (like bridges, tunnels, 
platforms, etc.) and cost overrun on these sub-contracts 
did not act as trigger for redesign on the other project- 
artifacts. On the contrary, local actors often considered 
the completion of an artefact like a tunnel (despite the 
cost factor) as an act of strong management and deci- 
siveness, a result of courage to “stand up” against central 
bureaucrats that should be followed by the other project 
agency-managers. In the last phase of the project, con- 
tract standardization was heavily increased by the (new) 
project director of the HSA-organization. Project con- 
trollers were empowered to intervene “if necessary”. The 
quarterly reports were based on the complicated report- 
ing procedures and ICT-systems. The reports about the 
various sub-projects more and more acted as internal 
bench and as vehicles for administrative and organiza- 
tional improvements (“standard issues” for instance 
were— in terms of time and cost—technical development, 
risk calculation, human capacity, environmental develop- 
ments and communication) for the central management. At 
the same time, contract-reality became detached from the 
“day to day” organizational practices and the prob- lems 
that were experiences in terms of internal coopera- tion, 
communication, team spirit and trust in the quality of the 
project outcome. Internal organizational audits (pin- 
pointed to major organizational-cultural problems 
and related risks in terms of communication gaps, unin- 
spiring management concepts/styles and internal distrust. 
Although the (quarterly and annual) reports were avai- 
lable via the intranet, only a small group of profess- 
sionals were able to read and interpret the report results. 
Project-agency managers “translated” the results in terms 
of their own organizational reality and strategically pre- 
sented the information for own purposes [20]. In ALPHA, 
the complexity reduction approach leads to multiple or- 
ganisational weaknesses. Entrepreneurship, innovation 
and courage, marked as critical issues by almost all key 
ALPHA players in the frontstage, become completely 
subordinate as a result of quotidian concerns and cost- 
related arguments. In the actual practice of the project 
team members, innovation appears to boil down to a 
simple struggle for survival by means of the creative 
translation of common agreements, pushing and pulling 
around points of contention, establishing internal coali- 
tions and looking after one’s own interests. 
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